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Foreign Ownership and Firm Financing  
Constraint in Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
  
This paper reveals why foreign ownership participation matters in the sensitivity 
relationship between investment and the internal liquidity of listed companies in 
Indonesia. This paper finds that foreign-owned enterprises are less financially 
constrained than domestic-owned ones, especially in terms of short-term 
investment following a financial crisis. Empirical evidence is provided by dividing 
157 firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange for at least five consecutive years 
between 1994 and 2004 into foreign-owned enterprises, and comparing their 
financing constraints and performance before and after the financial crisis during 
that period. The results also demonstrated that post-crisis foreign-owned 
enterprises performed better with higher sales, greater market opportunity and 
less leverage, leading to lower financing constraint. Subsequently, foreign-owned 
enterprises have a better capacity to invest more than local-owned ones.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent strategic management studies suggest that firm-specific factors are important in 
explaining the differential performance of firms (Rumelt et al., 1991). Firm-specific factors 
include property rights (ownership structure), financial resources, organizational process, 
management team skills etc., which are commonly linked to various firm performance 
indicators, such as profitability and firm value.  
Instead of investigating the firm performance, this paper is concerned with the 
relationship between ownership characteristics and investment behaviour in the midst of a 
financial crisis. The formal question is whether firms with a high level of foreign ownership 
(hereafter “foreign-owned enterprises”) perform better than ones with little or no foreign 
ownership (hereafter “domestic-owned enterprises”) under financial turbulence in Indonesia. 
To examine the impact of a crisis on firm-level investment, this paper focuses on the problem 
of financing constraint of firms. Performance is analysed, however, as an important 
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explanation of the firm capacity to invest in which better performance should be better 
investment opportunity (capacity). 
Studies on foreign companies in developing countries are always challenging, even 
though a huge amount of research has addressed this classical research question. This paper 
proposes a different perspective from common research in the field, which usually focus on 
profitability or firm value (Tobin’s Q), by concentrating on investment behaviour. Investment 
is measured as spending on fixed assets as long-term investment and inventory as short-term 
investment. This paper intends to investigate the behaviour of the two groups of firms, 
foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises, in two different periods, namely pre- and 
post-crisis.   
This study brings empirical evidence of investment response of foreign-owned 
enterprises in Indonesia to the severe crisis. More specifically, this study examines the 
sensitivity gap between investment and internal liquidity among foreign-owned and domestic-
owned enterprises listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX). Our hypothesis is that firm 
with a higher level of foreign ownership participation should be less financially constrained 
and performs better than firms with a lower proportion of foreign ownership. This study 
includes all non-financial firms listed on JSX for at least five consecutives years during 1994 
to 2004, 157 firms in total. Panel data analysis was employed to obtain explanation of the 
behaviour of individual firms in both time periods. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical review by 
focusing on the role of foreign companies in developing countries, and a short introduction to 
the Indonesian crisis. Section 3 contains empirical research. Description of data and 
discussion of findings are in Section 4. And Section 5 is the conclusion, including suggestions 
for further research. 
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2. Foreign-owned Enterprises in Developing Countries 
Following the financial crisis around developing countries, there is a growing interest 
among researchers to examine the different responses of foreign- and domestic-owned 
enterprises. Nowadays, the presence of foreign ownership in developing countries is a 
common phenomenon. Much research, therefore, has been carried out to address this issue. 
Recently, studies on the impact of a financial crisis on firms with foreign ownership have 
gained attention.   
From the perspective of the Resource-Based View (RBV), firm performance is 
basically heterogeneous in terms of efficiency and competitive capability, which would be 
reflected in the competitive performance of firms (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney 1991). Sinha 
(1993) found that foreign equity participation is associated with higher productivity. Haddad 
and Harrison (1993), using a panel of Moroccan manufacturing firms, found that although 
foreign-owned enterprises had higher productivity levels, they did not have faster rates of 
productivity growth. Aitken and Harrison (1999) used a panel of Venezuelan firms to provide 
evidence that there is a negative spill over of foreign-owned enterprises as the productivity of 
domestic-owned enterprises decreases. 
Moreover, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is usually assumed as the institution 
diffuses firm-specific assets such as technology, managerial ability, corporate governance, 
and access to the networks connecting to foreign markets (Kimura and Kiyota, 2004). Kimura 
and Kiyota (2004) explain that once foreign-owned enterprises set up a certain level of 
ownership in the equity of a firm, they acquire the power of control over the management of 
the firm and consequently are more receptive to transferring firm-specific assets. 
In East Asian countries, firms with foreign ownership are significantly more 
productive than those without foreign ownership (Hallward-Driemeier, 2002). Doms and 
 4
Jensen (1998) found that foreign-owned plants were more productive, more capital intensive 
and paid higher wages than domestic-owned enterprises even after controlling for industry, 
size, location and plant age. 
However, heterogeneity of firms is relatively subtle. Heterogeneous competitive 
performance emerges from heterogeneous factors such as input, resource, process, context, 
managerial capabilities, financing policies and so on. We argue that examination of firms 
facing financial crisis should provide valuable case studies for gaining pertinent 
understanding of the heterogeneity of firms. Financial crisis gives a particular context to firms 
where the heterogeneity of each firm becomes more and more evident.  Why do firms react 
differently when facing external shock? Why do some firms collapse and others survive? 
What determines the success or failure of firms facing financial crisis? These questions are 
especially relevant for discussion since a series of crises in the last decade.  
Currency depreciations are an ordinary phenomenon in history. However, large 
currency depreciation like that in the latter half of the 1990’s became an extraordinary event 
for various countries around the world, especially Mexico (1995) and East Asian countries 
(1997), with consequent effect on firms in those countries. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, currency depreciations in most cases are usually followed by a surge in 
production and improvement in economic growth, while in other cases are followed by a 
decline in output and severe recession (Forbes, 2002). In the East Asian region, there is strong 
evidence that the currency depreciation drove countries into deep and long-lasting severe 
economic crisis.  
From a microeconomic perspective, the monetary condition could directly induce firm 
level investment by the mechanism of interest rate fluctuation. There are two ways in which 
monetary policies are linked to firm-level policies. First, the interest rate influences the cost of 
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capital rather than firm investment. Second, the interest rate induces firm net cash flow (i.e., 
cash flow after interest payments). Therefore, the impact of monetary policies following an 
exchange rate fluctuation would be based on two aspects: the availability of external funds 
and the composition of the financial debt.   
By surveying literature on foreign-owned enterprises in emerging countries, this paper 
suggests that there are at least three principal branches of studies concerning this issue. The 
first branch focuses on firms’ performance by focusing on the problems of productivity and 
spill over. Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) describe that the positive effects of participating in 
a foreign multinational’s network can mainly be found in productivity and profitability.  
The second branch is concerned with financing policies and capital structure of 
multinational firms. Lee and Kwok (1998) examined various multinational companies’ debt-
equity ratios by focusing on the increase in the agency cost of debt of international activities. 
The third and most recent branch focuses on financial shocks. Some research has been done 
on the impact of large currency depreciation on firm performance (Forbes, 2002; Desai, Foley 
and Forbes, 2004). Several studies have focused on empirical evidence in East Asian 
countries (Claessens, Djankov and Xu, 2000) and Indonesia (Blalock, Gertler and Levine, 
2005).  
Based on firm-level data, this paper argues that following financial crisis foreign-
owned enterprises have a higher investment level since they can resolve more easily their 
financing constraints than domestic-owned enterprises. While domestic-owned enterprises 
have to struggle in rescuing their financial situation, which is followed by decline in 
investment level, especially in the presence of a credit crunch, foreign-owned enterprises have 
a better opportunity to relieve their financing constraints.  
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By empirical study, Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2005) found that foreign-owned 
enterprises, which have greater access to overseas financing, could overcome liquidity 
constraints during financial crisis. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) also provide evidence on 
the responses of the affiliates of multinational firms, which can expand sales, assets and 
investment after currency depreciation, thus mitigating some of the aggregate effects of the 
currency crisis. In contrast, local firms experience difficulties such as decrease in operating 
activity.  
In Indonesia, even though net exporting firms should benefit from better terms of trade 
and increase in investment following currency depreciation, the credit crunch following a 
twin crisis in the banking and currency sectors in Indonesia prevented domestic-owned 
enterprises from accessing credit, while foreign-owned enterprises relatively easily overcame 
this constraint since their parent companies provided access to overseas credit (Blalock and 
Gertler, 2005).  
 
3. Empirical Research 
3.1. Investment Equation 
To deal with the question of which group performs better, foreign- or domestic-owned 
companies, in the pre- and post-crisis periods, this paper employs a relatively rigorous 
equation measuring the sensitivity of firm-level investment and liquidity.  
Since the seminal paper of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP, 1988), the issue of 
financing constraints and firms’ investment has been a popular debate among scholars1. FHP 
(1988) show that firms, which are identified, a priori, as financially constrained have greater 
sensitivity in investment to the availability of internal finance in terms of cash flow. In their 
                                                 
1 Different from Modigliani and Miller (1958), FHP (1988) assume that external finance is more 
expensive because of the presence of asymmetric information.  
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proposition of a financing constraint paradigm, they claim that the sensitivity of investment 
and liquidity is driven by the presence of asymmetric information in a capital market.  
This argument is substantially different from the neoclassical perspective on 
investment such as that of Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958), who propose the irrelevance of 
financial structure theory by explaining that financial policy is not applicable to real 
investment decisions under certain conditions2. On the other hand, FHP (1988) propose that 
the theoretical model of imperfection in capital markets implies that external financing is 
more costly than internal financing for many firms. Since the degree of asymmetric 
information and agency costs depends on a firm’s characteristics, certain firms may be more 
sensitive to financial factors than others. In other words, industrial and individual 
characteristics of the firms become important determinants of investment sensitivity to 
internal finance (cash flow).  
Investment is significantly correlated with proxies for change in net worth or internal 
funds. In this paper, as in many studies, especially FHP (1988), the effect of financing is 
measured by the ratio of cash flow to capital stock ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
K
CF . A large body of research has found 
that investment and cash flow sensitivities are higher for financially constrained firms (FHP, 
1998; Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002).  
To provide empirical evidence, this paper uses the basic equation originally developed 
by FHP (1988) as follows: 
I = f(Investment opportunities) + g(Internal funds) 
or 
 
                                                 
2 In their seminal paper, “Theory of Capital Structure” in 1958, MM assume that a firm’s financial 
structure will not affect its market value in a frictionless capital market: they assume that information 
is perfect in a capital market.  
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where itI  represents investment in fixed assets for firm i  during period t , X  represents a 
vector of variables, and ε is an error term for i and t.  
Following FHP (1988), function g depends on a firm’s internal cash flow (CF), which 
represents the potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in available internal finance, 
after investment opportunities are controlled for through the variable X. All variables are 
divided by the paid-in capital at the beginning of the period (Kt-1). 
It is common to categorize the sensitivity of internal capital and investment according 
to the characteristics of a firm, such as low or high dividend payout rate (FHP, 1998), 
Keiretsu or independent firms (Hoshi et al., 1991), bond rating (Whited, 1992), and tradable 
or non-tradable sector (Espanol 2005). Since the interest of this research resides in the 
question of foreign-owned enterprises, regression was performed for different categories of 
firm, namely foreign-owned enterprises (hereafter FOE) and domestic-owned enterprises 
(hereafter DOE)3. This paper categorizes investment into two types, fixed assets as a proxy 
for long-term investment and inventory as a proxy for short-term investment. To capture the 
sensitivity of Foreign-owned enterprises and Domestic-owned enterprises, this paper uses 
equation (2) as follows.  
 
 
                                                 
3 For the sake of simplicity, we define a firm with foreign ownership participation as FOE and all 
other firms as DOE. This definition is to avoid confusion with Multi National Corporations (MNCs). 
This study is not about MNCs, but firms with majority foreign ownership.  
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where: 
K  = Fixed assets 
I   =  Long-term or gross investment (Kt – Kt-1) and short- 
term investment (Inventory t – Inventory t-1) 
CF  = Cash flow 
Q  = Tobin’s Q (market capitalization deflated by book value) 
S  = Total sales 
ΔWK  = Change in working capital (current assets – current liabilities) 
D  = Total debt  
FOE   = “1” if a firm has more than 50 percent foreign ownership  
participation (Foreign-owned enterprises) and “0” for all other firms  
(Domestic-owned enterprises) 
DOE  = Domestic-owned enterprises 
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1. Investment  
Firm-level investment is generally considered the combined value of machinery, 
plants and buildings that are bought by firms for production purposes. Accordingly, this paper 
uses fixed assets as a proxy for long-term investment. Theoretical prediction estimates that 
financially constrained firms can be identified and should display a stronger sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow (FHP, 1988; Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002; Bruinshoofd, 2003). In 
this case, if Foreign-owned enterprises face larger financing constraints than Domestic-owned 
enterprises, it should be expected that cfFOEα   is higher than cfDOEα   
  
3.2.2. Cash Flow 
In Fazzari, Ferri and Greenberg (2003), we find that in the Keynesian endogenous 
investment model, if cash flow is insufficient to finance investment, firms take on debt. The 
 10
implication is that investment activities should be financed primarily by internal finance. In 
this case, cash flow should be negatively correlated to firm investment.   
Recently, a large body of literature suggested that because of information asymmetries 
and capital market imperfections, corporate investment expenditure is significantly influenced 
by the internal ability of firms to generate internal cash. This indicates that the firms prefer 
internal equity rather than external debt, meaning investment is negatively correlated with 
debt.  
 
3.2.3. Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is associated with a firm’s market capitalization, reflecting the market 
anticipation of the profitability of a firm’s investment. Tobin’s Q is measured by the market 
value of assets deflated by their book value. In this paper, qα   is expected to be positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
 
3.2.4. Profitability 
In this paper, sales in the previous period are used as a proxy for profitability. 
Generally it is assumed that profitability will increase with investment. Thus, we expected 
that profitability would be positive and statistically significant. Profitability is considered to 
be an indicator of the past and potential future performance of a firm. This is consistent with 
the sales accelerator model: a higher level of sales will enhance production capacity in order 
to meet enlarged demand (FHP, 1988). 
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3.2.5. Working Capital  
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) describe that working capital is current assets (chiefly 
accounts receivable, inventory and cash) less current liabilities (primarily accounts payable 
and short-term debt), and measures the firm’s net liquid assets. Due to financing constraint, 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that it is costly for firms to change the level of fixed 
investment, and thus they seek to maintain a stable fixed-investment path, all other things 
being equal, by adjusting working capital. This argument is comparable with the hypothesis 
on internal net worth of Bernanke and Gertler (1989).  
External finance, if available, may be more costly than internal finance because of 
transaction costs, agency problems, or asymmetric information. Thus, all other things being 
equal, when firms choose to decrease (increase) working capital investment, fixed investment 
should rise (fall).  
In this case, wkα   is expected to be negative and statistically significant.  
 
 
3.2.6. Debt 
There are two opposing theoretical analyses about the relationship between a firm’s 
leverage and cash flow. Trade-off theory suggests a positive relationship (MM, 1958), while 
pecking order behaviour implies a negative relationship (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Meanwhile, signalling theory suggests that a higher debt ratio can be considered as a signal of 
improved capacity to finance investment, and hence the relationship between debt and 
investment is expected to be positive. 
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4. Data and Results  
4.1. Data set 
For this study, all non-financial listed companies on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) 
were included by using yearly accounting data from the JSX database. However, since this 
database lacks sufficient data, data to complete the data set was obtained from the Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory (ICMD) provided by ECFIN, a private consulting enterprise. 
 Initially, 298 firms were selected. However, since only those firms listed on JSX for 
at least 5 five consecutives years were to be included, the sample decreased to 234 firms. 
Furthermore, since from the standard deviation and median, there was wide fluctuation in the 
data, firms with median of more than 1.5 and standard deviation of more than 11 percent were 
excluded. Finally, 157 firms in the period 1994 to 2004 were selected as the sample data set in 
this study.  
To split the data set into two different groups for the purpose of this study, degree of 
foreign participation was used as a proxy for foreign-owned enterprises. “Dominating 
shareholder” was defined as meaning ownership of more than 50 percent, namely, ownership 
level that can dominate the decision making of firms. 
 Concerning the period for examining the behaviour of the two groups of firms, pre-
crisis was defined as 1994 to 1996 and post-crisis was defined as 1999 to 2004. We excluded 
the period during the crisis, 1997 and 1998, since it was considered that there would have 
been many extraordinary events influencing firms. During the period of the crisis, many firms 
in Indonesia suffered significant financial difficulties.  
 For the definition of foreign-owned enterprises and domestic-owned enterprises, data 
of firm’s ownership structure was taken using two proxies: ownership structure in 1996 
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representing the pre-crisis period and that in 2003 for the post-crisis period. The distribution 
of the samples is described as follows (Tables 1 and 2). In the sample data set of 157 firms, 20 
were categorized as foreign-owned enterprises and 137 as domestic-owned enterprises. 
Among foreign-owned enterprises 16 were tradable and 4 were non-tradable firms.    
--------------------------- 
Table 1 & 2 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
4.2. Univariate Analysis  
 Tables 3 and 4 summarize the descriptive statistics for the Foreign-owned enterprises 
and Domestic-owned enterprises. Mean investment variable data show that Domestic-owned 
enterprises (0.2753) have a higher investment level than Foreign-owned enterprises (0.0303). 
Meanwhile, mean inventory was higher for Foreign-owned enterprises (3.8222) than for 
Domestic-owned enterprises (3.3927). To evaluate significant difference between the two 
groups of firms, the t-test was performed for the mean, median and variance differences.  
There was no significant difference between mean investment of foreign-owned 
enterprises and that of domestic-owned enterprises. This was also the case for the inventory 
variable. However, significant differences in the median for both variables was observed4, 
indicating that investment of domestic-owned enterprises was at a higher level than that of 
foreign-owned enterprises (significant at the 10 percent level), whereas there was no 
significant difference for the inventory of either group. Meanwhile, testing for difference in 
variance showed that domestic-owned firm investment was much more volatile than foreign-
owned firm investment. However, the data indicated no significant difference in variance for 
inventory between domestic-owned enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises.  
                                                 
4 To test for significant difference of the median, the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum test, 
provided by the STATA statistical software program, was employed.  
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 Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics for cash flow. The cash flow of foreign-
owned enterprises and domestic-owned enterprises seemed comparable. There was no 
significant difference by t-test for the mean, however, foreign-owned enterprises were 
indicated to have higher cash flow by t-test for median difference. Variance difference 
indicated that domestic-owned enterprises were likely to have more volatile cash flow than 
foreign-owned enterprises.  
------------------------- 
Table 3&4 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
Two important observations in the univariate analysis were expected to be sales and 
debt. Tests for both mean and median differences showed that foreign-owned enterprises had 
better sales and less debt than domestic-owned enterprises. Test for variance difference 
showed that foreign-owned enterprises were more stable for both variables than those of 
domestic-owned enterprises. Thus, it can be concluded that foreign-owned enterprises had 
better and more stable performance than domestic-owned enterprises.  
By univariate analysis, it was rigorously found that domestic-owned enterprises had a 
greater debt ratio than foreign-owned enterprises. These findings are consistent with those of 
other previous studies that investment in developing countries mostly is financed by external 
debt5. Moreover, foreign-owned enterprises have less severe problems in both long-term 
(fixed assets) and short-term (inventory) investment. It is important to note that, by observing 
the descriptive data, it seemed that foreign-owned enterprises preferred not to outlay in long-
term investment. On the other hand, the performance of short-term investment and other 
                                                 
5 See for example, Pomerleano, 1998, Claessens et al., 2000, Booth et al., 2001 and Allayannis et 
al., 2003. 
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measurements, such as working capital and sales, were better for Foreign-owned enterprises 
than domestic-owned enterprises.   
Overall, it should be noted that domestic-owned enterprises had a much higher level of 
debt compared to domestic-owned enterprises. In terms of firm-level performance, measured 
by inventory, sales and working capital, foreign-owned enterprises showed better indices than 
domestic-owned enterprises. However, investment in fixed assets by foreign-owned 
enterprises was lower than that of domestic-owned enterprises.  
 
Figure 1. Median Cash Flow 
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Figure 2. Median Inventory 
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Figure 3. Median Sales 
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4.3. Multivariate Analysis  
4.3.1. Financing Constraint and Firm Investment  
Three methods were used for regression: (1) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) robust or 
OLS with correction for heteroscedasticity problem, (2) fixed effect (FE) and random effect 
(RE) methods.  OLS provides basic multivariate correlation embedded in the data, a method 
much criticized since the estimations do not control for unobservable characteristics that 
could be biasing the estimated coefficients. The FE method corrects some discrepancies by 
controlling for some of these unobservable characteristics using dummy variables. However, 
FE estimation neglects all cross-sectional variation, which is fulfilled by RE estimates. 
To decide which method to select, the OLS or FE method, the F-test from the FE 
method was used. If we could reject the null hypothesis at its traditional value, the FE method 
would be selected over the OLS method. Secondly, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier (LM) test was performed to select between the OLS and RE methods. If the LM 
test rejected the null hypothesis at its traditional value, RE should be selected. And for 
selecting between FE and RE, the Hausman test was performed.  The FE method would be 
selected if the null hypothesis at its traditional value is rejected.  
 17
Tables 6 and 7 provide the results of baseline regressions. Table 6 shows the 
regression for investment in both the pre- and post-crisis periods, whereas Table 7 provides 
the results for inventory. After considering the results of the F-test, LM test and Hausman test, 
the FE method seemed the most favourable for evaluating investment for the total period.  
The findings indicated that for the total period, both foreign-owned enterprises and 
domestic-owned enterprises, a priori, had no significant financing constraints. The sensitivity 
relationship between internal cash flow and investment was comparable for both groups. 
However, it seemed that foreign-owned firm cash flow (-0.0568) was slightly more sensitive 
to investment than domestic-owned firm cash flow (-0.9104).  
Table 6 also shows that investment behaviour of firms listed on JSX is strongly 
influenced by sales, working capital and debt. Sales and debt are positively and significantly 
correlated with investment, whereas working capital has a negative correlation. Moreover, 
debt has a relatively high level of correlation (0.5688) with investment, which could mean 
that firms have to augment the level of debt to enhance investment.   
Table 7 shows that the F-test for the FE method could not reject the null hypothesis, 
but the LM test showed statistical significance. This means that, a priori, the RE method is 
more favourable than the OLS robust and FE methods.  
In terms of inventory or short-term investment, neither foreign-owned enterprises nor 
domestic-owned enterprises had significant financing constraint in the total period, since the 
correlation coefficient between internal finance and investment was negative. However, 
broadly speaking, domestic-owned enterprises had a tendency of higher sensitivity of internal 
finance than foreign-owned enterprises, which could mean that domestic-owned enterprises 
have greater problems in internal finance than foreign-owned enterprises. In the case of 
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domestic-owned enterprises, cash flow was negatively and significantly correlated to 
inventory, meaning that to maintain inventory firms had to employ internal finance.  
Generally, for all the firms, debt was not a significant factor for inventory. Otherwise, 
sales and working capital were positively and significantly correlated to inventory. This is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction that inventory is associated with sales: more sales 
requiring more inventories.  
---------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
---------------------- 
 
 
----------------- 
Table 6&7 
-------------- 
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4.3.2. Pre- and Post-Crisis Investment Behaviour 
Table 6 shows the results of pre- and post-crisis estimates for investment, whereas 
Table 7 demonstrates the results for inventory. For Table 6, FE was selected for estimates in 
the pre- and post-crisis periods. From the results, foreign-owned enterprises seemed to have 
had no significant financing problems, since the traditional value of the investment-internal 
finance sensitivity was not significant.  
Meanwhile, domestic-owned enterprises had significant negative correlation between 
cash flow and investment in the pre-crisis period, whereas in the post-crisis period the 
coefficient turned positive. It seemed that domestic-owned enterprises had no financing 
constraint in the pre-crisis period, but did in the post-crisis period.  
The empirical evidence also showed that in the pre-crisis period, working capital was 
negatively correlated to investment but debt was positively correlated to investment. It 
seemed that firms rely much on debt or external finance to support their investment activities. 
In post-crisis, debt was still correlated positively to investment, but the coefficient (0.3846) 
was much smaller than that in the pre-crisis period (1.0972). This evidence strongly supports 
the analysis that in the pre-crisis period, firms in Indonesia were much exposed to external 
finance.  
In the post-crisis period, working capital and sales correlated positively with 
investment. It seemed that the listed companies tended to prefer internal finance over-external 
finance to support their investment. To obtain greater profit meant a requirement for more 
investment, with working capital also associated positively with investment. This concurs 
with the findings of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) who argue that when there is a shortage of 
financing for investment, working capital will be firstly employed to support investment 
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activities. In the post-crisis period in Indonesia, since external financing was constrained due 
to the credit crunch6, investment decreased with working capital.  
 It is not surprising that debt level positively correlated with investment in the total 
period, both the pre- and post-crisis periods, in Indonesia. According to many previous 
studies, most companies in Indonesia and other countries in the South East Asia region were 
financed by external debts (see for example Claessens et al., 2000). The argument is that since 
the level of debt was relatively high in the pre-crisis period, firms had to access debt at a high 
level in the post-crisis period to support their activities at the same level as that in the pre-
crisis period. Furthermore, to repay their high level debt they had to have high level debt also.  
 In terms of inventory activities, neither foreign-owned enterprises nor domestic-owned 
enterprises had any significant problems in internal finance: sales were positively correlated 
to inventory both in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper found that foreign-owned enterprises have lower commitment to long-term 
investment (fixed assets) compared to domestic-owned enterprises, even though the spending 
on short-term investment (inventory) was higher than that of domestic-owned enterprises. 
Foreign-owned enterprises tended to postpone long-term investment commitment in the 
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia. More specifically, foreign owners 
appeared reluctant to spend their budget on financing fixed asset transactions, Indonesia 
failing to attract foreign investment in such an economic climate.  
The findings also demonstrate that compared to domestic-owned enterprises, foreign-
owned enterprises suffered fewer severe problems due to financial crisis, even though their 
spending on fixed-asset investment was lower than that of domestic-owned enterprises. This 
                                                 
6 Study of Bank Indonesia shows this evidence of credit crunch. See Juda et al., (2000) 
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may shed light on the reason why foreign-owned enterprises had a more stable level of 
operations than domestic-owned enterprises. The argument that foreign-owned enterprises 
performed better operationally is supported by the evidence that foreign-owned enterprises 
had better performance from working capital and sales than domestic-owned enterprises. 
Meanwhile, domestic-owned enterprises were much more exposed to external finance or 
debts than foreign-owned enterprises. Based on this evidence, the tentative conclusion of this 
study is that foreign-owned enterprises are less financially constrained following financial 
crisis in Indonesia than domestic-owned ones.  
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the differential 
behaviour of investment, both long-term and short-term, among Indonesian firms with and 
without majority foreign ownership participation. This paper also brings an understanding of 
the relationship of debts, firm profitability and other variables related to investment of firms 
in financial crisis. For future research, differentiation of other ownership characteristics would 
be interesting to develop, such as banking and non-banking ownership, family and non-family 
ownership, state and non-states ownership etc.  
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Firm type  Tradable Non-tradable Sample 
All companies 110 47 157 
Foreign-owned firm (FOF) 16 4 20 
Domestic-owned firm (DOF) 94 43 137 
 
Table 2.  Distribution by Sector 
Sector FOE DOE 
Agriculture 1 5 
Mining 3 4 
Basic industry & chemical 2 41 
Miscellaneous industry 5 23 
Consumer good industry 5 19 
Property, real estate & building 
construction 
1 5 
Infrastructure, utilities & transportation 1 12 
Trade, service & investment 2 28 
Total  20 137 
 
Table 3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (FOE) 
  
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
Investment overall 0,0303 0,4815 -0,7822 3,2691 N =     192 
 between  0,5005 -0,7236 3,2691 n =     111 
 within  0,2804 -0,6529 1,9105 T-bar = 1.72973 
       
Inventory overall 3,8222 10,0550 -14,7943 57,0464 N =     192 
 between  10,7253 -13,2860 57,0464 n =     111 
 within  5,5337 -19,4154 34,0598 T-bar = 1.72973 
       
Cash Flow overall 0,0424 0,2313 -0,9087 1,3127 N =     192 
 between  0,2483 -0,9087 0,8123 n =     111 
 within  0,1280 -0,5766 1,1925 T-bar = 1.72973 
       
Tobin Q overall 0,7891 6,2062 -74,5800 23,2179 N =     192 
 between  7,4226 -74,5800 15,2752 n =     111 
 within  2,3290 -17,9297 19,8480 T-bar = 1.72973 
       
Sales overall 2,3990 1,8443 0,1046 7,9696 N =     192 
 between  1,9229 0,2613 7,9696 n =     111 
 within  0,5701 -0,0939 4,5232 T-bar = 1.72973 
       
Working 
capital 
overall 0,0956 0,5820 -2,0492 2,8503 N =     192 
 between  0,6106 -2,0492 2,8503 n =     111 
 within  0,3473 -1,6232 1,8838 T-bar = 1.72973 
Debt overall 1,3860 0,9848 0,1160 6,2506 N =     192 
 between  0,8771 0,1160 3,5212 n =     111 
 within  0,4503 -0,6482 4,1154 T-bar = 1.72973 
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Table 6.4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (DOE) 
 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
Investment overall 0,2753 2,7894 -0,9612 62,1890 N =    1250 
 between  2,5614 -0,9612 46,5678 n =     694 
 within  1,9489 -6,4943 56,2701 T-bar = 1.80115 
       
Inventory overall 3,3927 10,9538 -35,5681 68,4024 N =    1250 
 between  8,8598 -35,5681 68,4024 n =     694 
 within  8,0264 -43,3258 58,6125 T-bar = 1.80115 
       
Cash Flow overall 0,0480 0,4779 -5,0614 7,8443 N =    1250 
 between  0,4007 -1,8307 6,6026 n =     694 
 within  0,3575 -4,4943 7,0794 T-bar = 1.80115 
       
Tobin Q overall 0,9941 3,2281 -56,8902 32,0961 N =    1249 
 between  2,3383 -14,0412 32,0961 n =     694 
 within  2,5642 -50,0456 25,2715 T-bar = 1.79971 
       
Sales overall 2,0031 2,8815 0,0147 38,9956 N =    1250 
 between  2,4157 0,0147 38,9956 n =     694 
 within  1,6502 -4,3478 32,3916 T-bar = 1.80115 
       
Working Capital overall -0,0018 1,4556 -18,2008 17,4635 N =    1250 
 between  1,4713 -13,1026 17,4635 n =     694 
 within  0,9300 -16,3273 12,0002 T-bar = 1.80115 
       
Debt overall 2,0059 3,0705 0,0526 47,3772 N =    1250 
 between  2,7761 0,0526 37,2297 n =     694 
 within  1,9835 -4,8505 43,9390 T-bar = 1.80115 
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Table 5. Summary of Tests of Significant Differences 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10,5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Variable Mean diff Median diff Variance diff 
Investment 1.2140  1.802 * *** 
    
Inventory -0.5112  -0.101   
    
Cash Flow 0.1585  -2.288 ** *** 
    
Tobin 0.7032  -1.262  *** 
    
Sales -1.8462 * -4.976 *** *** 
    
Working 
Capital 
-0.9156  -3.097 *** *** 
    
Debt  2.7751 *** 2.900 *** *** 
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Table 6. Result of Regression for Investment  
The dependent variable is investment, proxied by the change in capital stock (fixed assets). This variable is defined as 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−
−
1
1
t
tt
FA
FAFA , where FA is fixed-assets. OLS Robust is OLS with 
correction for heteroscedasticy problem (the White method).  *,**,*** denote significance at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses.  
 Total Period Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
 OLS Robust Fixed-Effect Random-Effect OLS Robust FixedEffect  Random Effect OLS Robust Fixed-Effect RandomEffect 
CF-FOE -0,0196  -0,0568  -0,0275  1,0076 *** 0,0429  0,5907  -0,3155  -0,2865  -0,3266  
 (0,2474)  (0,9792)  (0,5912)  (0,2921)  (1,5153)  (1,2801)  (0,2592)  (0,6587)  (0,4497)  
CF-DOE 0,0270  -0,9104 *** -0,0041  -0,7895 * -0,7363 *** -0,8854 *** 2,0144 * -0,0450  1,8860 *** 
 (0,7538)  (0,1414)  (0,1160)  (0,4421)  (0,2695)  (0,1829)  (1,0489)  (0,1602)  (0,1281)  
Tobin’s Q 0,0252 *** 0,0101  0,0227 * 0,1292 * 0,0621  0,0907  0,0074 * -0,0078  0,0063  
 (0,0091)  (0,0180)  (0,0134)  (0,0744)  (0,2182)  (0,0825)  (0,0040)  (0,0122)  (0,0097)  
Sales 0,0962  0,1130 *** 0,1197 *** -0,2951 *** -0,0791  -0,3190 *** 0,1378 ** 0,0597 ** 0,1572 *** 
 (0,0624)  (0,0320)  (0,0210)  (0,0858)  (0,1256)  (0,0435)  (0,0601)  (0,0267)  (0,0169)  
Working Capital -0,6236 *** -0,4291 *** -0,6007 *** -0,6129 *** -0,4121 *** -0,5112 *** -0,1091  0,1946 *** -0,0930 *** 
 (0,2292)  (0,0585)  (0,0383)  (0,2235)  (0,1526)  (0,0902)  (0,0901)  (0,0512)  (0,0341)  
Debt 0,4213 *** 0,5688 *** 0,4337 *** 0,9438 *** 1,0972 *** 1,0275 *** 0,1841 ** 0,3846 *** 0,1957 *** 
 (0,1443)  (0,0293)  (0,0198)  (0,1151)  (0,0737)  (0,0406)  (0,0806)  (0,0416)  (0,0186)  
Constant -0,7847 ***     -0,6019 ***     -0,5835 **     
 (0,2508)      (0,1733)      (0,2354)      
                   
No. of observations 1441  1441  1441  241  241  241  914  914  914  
R2 0.4579  0.6003  0.5644   0.9008  0.9064   0.7781  0.4663  0.2439  0.7054   
                   
F-test   1.41 ***     3.40  ***      1.93 ***   
Breusch and Pagan  
LM test 
     20.46 ***     2.58      1.42  
Hausman test   250.57 ***     108.25 ***     486.15 ***   
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Table 7. Result of Regression for Inventory  
The dependent variable is inventory. In this model, inventory is defined as 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−
−
1
1
t
tt
FA
InventoryInventory , where FA is fixed-assets. FA or capital stock is employed to deflate all variables, 
except Tobin Q, in the equation. OLS Robust is OLS with correction for heteroscedasticy problem (the White method).  *,**,*** denote significance at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. In this regression, Hausman tests were not performed since the random-effects estimator has degenerated to pooled OLS and 
the Wald test from xthausman may not be appropriate. 
 Total Period Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
 OLS Robust Fixed-Effect Random-Effect OLS Robust Fixed-Effect Random-Effect OLS Robust Fixed-Effect Random-Effect 
CF-FOE -3,9532  -11,6713 * -3,9532  5,0571 * 9,0606  5,0571  -6,2471 * -15,0739 * -6,2471  
 (3,2917)  (6,5198)  (3,2900)  (3,0060)  (16,5591)  (7,2249)  (3,7681)  (8,2582)  (4,1639)  
CF-DOE -1,5891  -1,6735 * -1,5891 ** 0,0327  -2,7853  0,0327  -4,7497 *** -6,3027 *** -4,7497 *** 
 (1,0423)  (0,9412)  (0,6493)  (1,2101)  (2,9450)  (0,9943)  (1,4849)  (2,0088)  (1,1811)  
Tobin’s Q 0,0058  0,0078  0,0058  0,1695  2,7090  0,1695  0,0026  -0,0653  0,0026  
 (0,0395)  (0,1201)  (0,0748)  (0,3387)  (2,3848)  (0,3856)  (0,0397)  (0,1534)  (0,0893)  
Sales 0,7972 *** 0,3821 * 0,7972 *** 0,3921  3,6782 *** 0,3921 ** 0,9470 *** 0,1009  0,9470 *** 
 (0,2272)  (0,2129)  (0,1118)  (0,3648)  (1,3721)  (0,2046)  (0,3166)  (0,3344)  (0,1478)  
Working Capital 0,4409 * 0,4887  0,4409 ** 1,4071 * 2,6224  1,4071 *** 0,2301  0,2844  0,2301  
 (0,2341)  (0,3895)  (0,2136)  (0,8598)  (1,6675)  (0,4740)  (0,2942)  (0,6423)  (0,3156)  
Debt -0,0061  0,2984  -0,0061  0,6021 * -0,0814  0,6021 *** -0,0278  1,0341 ** -0,0278  
 (0,1250)  (0,1950)  (0,1088)  (0,3676)  (0,8052)  (0,2135)  (0,1725)  (0,5216)  (0,1668)  
Constant 1,9020 ***     0,9129  -8,0826  0,9129  1,3838 **     
 (0,3906)      (0,6910)  (4,0810)  (0,7208)  (0,6298)      
                   
No. of observations 1441  1441  1441  241  241  241  914  914  914  
R2 0.0412  0.0228  0.0557  0.1596  0.2999  0.1965  0.0544  0.0418  0.0751  
                   
F-test   0.73      0.54         0.71    
Breusch and Pagan 
LM test 
    3.87 **      11.97 ***     0.27  
 
